What FATF identified about transaction splitting, threshold avoidance and linked casino activity
Money laundering does not always involve one large and obviously suspicious transaction.
Sometimes, the opposite is true.
A large amount of money may be deliberately divided into numerous smaller transactions so that each individual transaction appears less significant. This practice is commonly known as structuring or smurfing.
The FATF/APG report Vulnerabilities of Casinos and Gaming Sector, published in March 2009, identified structuring as one of the specific methods through which criminals could attempt to use casinos to launder illicit proceeds.
For payment processors, acquiring institutions, merchant underwriters and AML teams, the lesson is highly relevant:
A transaction can look ordinary when viewed individually while becoming suspicious when viewed as part of a larger pattern.
The casino environment makes this particularly important because customers can move value through multiple instruments, accounts, transactions, gaming activities and cash-out mechanisms.
- What Is Structuring?
The FATF/APG report defines structuring, or “smurfing,” as the distribution of a large amount of cash into a number of smaller transactions in order to minimise suspicion and evade threshold reporting requirements.
The basic concept is straightforward.
Instead of:
$100,000 → one transaction
the activity may appear as:
$9,500 + $9,800 + $9,700 + $9,600 + …
The objective is not necessarily to make the total amount smaller.
The objective is to make each individual transaction appear less significant.
This distinction is fundamental to transaction monitoring.
A risk system that evaluates only individual transaction values can miss the broader behaviour.
A system that evaluates relationships, velocity, frequency, counterparties and cumulative activity has a better opportunity to identify the pattern.
- Why Casinos Are Vulnerable to Structuring
Casinos provide a particularly complex environment for transaction monitoring.
A customer may:
- purchase chips;
- play at different tables;
- move between gaming rooms;
- use casino accounts;
- receive winnings;
- cash out chips;
- receive casino cheques;
- use gaming-machine credits;
- use third parties;
- transfer value between accounts;
- interact with junket operators;
- move between casinos within the same group.
The FATF/APG report highlights that casinos offer numerous value instruments and transaction channels that can be used in money-laundering schemes.
Consequently, the risk is not simply:
How much did the customer transact?
It is:
How much value moved, through how many transactions, involving whom, over what period, and with what corresponding gaming or economic activity?
That is a much more sophisticated question.
- The Threshold Problem
Reporting thresholds exist for legitimate regulatory purposes.
But criminals may study those thresholds and design their behaviour around them.
The FATF/APG report specifically identified the repeated use of transactions below applicable reporting limits as a structuring technique.
Examples identified in the report include:
- repeatedly depositing similar cash amounts below the reporting limit;
- using third parties to transact through one or multiple accounts;
- using cheques from different financial institutions or branches where each cheque remains below the threshold;
- using casino staff shift changes to cash in chips or other value instruments;
- moving between gaming tables or rooms;
- moving between junkets or casinos within a chain;
- breaking winnings into smaller cash or chip amounts below the reporting threshold.
The important concept is linked activity.
If five transactions are each below a threshold but are clearly connected, looking at them independently can produce the wrong conclusion.
- Structuring Is About Behaviour, Not Just Amount
One of the most important lessons from the report is that transaction value alone should not determine suspicion.
Consider two customers.
Customer A
A high-net-worth customer deposits a large amount, conducts substantial gaming activity and subsequently withdraws funds consistent with the customer’s established profile.
Customer B
A customer repeatedly makes transactions just below a reporting threshold, moves between locations or accounts, involves different people and ultimately cashes out a similar aggregate amount without corresponding gaming activity.
The individual transaction values might look similar.
The behavioural patterns are completely different.
The FATF/APG report therefore identifies a broad range of indicators rather than treating one transaction amount as conclusive evidence.
Among the indicators are frequent buy-ins and cash-outs just below thresholds, cash deposits and withdrawals just below thresholds, wire transfers or currency exchanges just below thresholds, and requests to divide winnings into amounts below reporting thresholds.
This distinction is essential:
An indicator is a reason to investigate, not proof of money laundering.
- Third Parties Make Structuring More Difficult to Detect
Structuring becomes significantly more complex when several individuals participate.
The report identifies the use of third parties as a recurring feature of structuring activity.
Instead of one person conducting all transactions, multiple individuals may appear to conduct separate activity.
From a simplistic monitoring perspective:
Person A → small transaction
Person B → small transaction
Person C → small transaction
Each transaction might appear unrelated.
But if the individuals are connected and the funds ultimately converge on the same person, account or beneficiary, the risk picture changes.
The report specifically identifies:
- multiple accounts under multiple names;
- multiple individuals sending funds to one beneficiary;
- third-party transactions;
- third parties purchasing gaming chips;
- third parties conducting wagering;
- transfers into third-party accounts;
- third parties conducting deposits and wire transfers.
For AML teams, this reinforces the importance of relationship analysis.
The question is not simply:
“Did this customer exceed a threshold?”
It is also:
“Who else appears to be connected to this customer’s activity?”
- Multiple Names and Multiple Accounts
The FATF report identifies associations with multiple accounts under multiple names and the use of multiple names to conduct similar activity as indicators associated with structuring and refining.
This can create a significant challenge for institutions.
A system that treats every account as completely independent may fail to identify that:
- several accounts share behavioural characteristics;
- transactions repeatedly converge on the same beneficiary;
- different individuals transact with the same merchant or casino;
- the same pattern occurs across different accounts;
- funds move between related accounts.
This is why modern transaction monitoring increasingly needs to move beyond account-level monitoring toward entity and network-level analysis.
- The Shift-Change Vulnerability
One particularly interesting observation in the FATF/APG report concerns casino staff shift changes.
The report notes that criminals were aware of changes in casino staff shifts and could attempt to use those changes to avoid reporting requirements.
This is a powerful example of how criminals can exploit operational fragmentation.
Suppose several transactions are made during one period.
If one employee sees only the first transactions and another employee sees only the later transactions, neither may immediately understand the complete pattern.
The FATF report specifically describes the use of shift changes to systematically cash in chips or other value instruments below reporting thresholds.
The broader lesson applies well beyond casinos:
Any control that depends on fragmented human observation can be weakened when information is not consolidated.
- Moving Between Tables, Rooms and Casinos
Structuring does not necessarily require multiple people.
A single customer can potentially distribute activity across different operational points.
The report identifies customers switching gaming tables, gaming rooms, junkets or casinos within a chain when wagering amounts approach reporting thresholds as a structuring indicator.
This illustrates another important AML principle:
Physical or organisational separation does not necessarily mean transactional separation.
If the same customer is moving through several parts of the same casino operation, the monitoring framework needs to understand that activity as a whole.
The same principle becomes even more important for casino groups operating across multiple properties.
- Splitting Winnings
Structuring can also occur on the withdrawal side.
The FATF/APG report identifies requests for winnings or prize money exceeding the reporting threshold to be divided into smaller cash and chip amounts below the threshold as a specific indicator.
This demonstrates why AML monitoring should not focus exclusively on deposits.
A complete risk assessment should examine both:
Value entering the system
and
Value leaving the system.
A suspicious pattern may emerge from the relationship between:
Buy-in → Gaming → Cash-out
rather than from any single event.
The report also identifies frequent cash-outs without corresponding buy-ins, or vice versa, as an indicator.
- When Structuring Becomes Almost Invisible
The most challenging cases are not necessarily those involving obvious threshold avoidance.
They can involve several different behaviours simultaneously.
For example, the FATF report identifies combinations such as:
- high transaction volume within a short period;
- multiple chip cash-outs on the same day;
- chip cash-out amounts similar to chip purchases;
- use of multiple names;
- third-party chip purchases;
- little or no gaming activity;
- frequent transactions just below thresholds;
- changes in betting patterns;
- rapid increases in transaction frequency.
Individually, some of these behaviours may have legitimate explanations.
Together, however, they can form a much stronger risk signal.
This is the difference between rule-based monitoring and behavioural monitoring.
- The Counterintuitive Strategy: Triggering a Report
Perhaps one of the most interesting observations in the FATF/APG report is that some money launderers may actually attempt to trigger a cash transaction report rather than avoid one.
The report explains that criminals can seek to use the resulting report to authenticate or legitimise a suspicious transaction.
The report provides a case in which several people purchased chips using illicit cash in amounts below the reporting threshold and then transferred the chips to one individual, who cashed them out and received a casino cheque, triggering a transaction report. Over twelve months, that individual was named in reports for approximately USD 1.1 million paid out but was not named in a corresponding report for cash taken in.
This creates a critical AML lesson:
A regulatory report does not automatically make a transaction legitimate.
A transaction can be properly reported and still require investigation.
Compliance should therefore not become a box-ticking exercise where:
“Report filed” = “risk resolved.”
The underlying source, counterparties, transaction history and economic rationale still matter.
- The Importance of Cumulative Monitoring
The FATF/APG report highlights difficulties jurisdictions experienced in determining an appropriate timeframe for deciding whether transactions should be treated as linked for threshold purposes.
This is one of the most important technical lessons for payment and gaming businesses.
Monitoring should consider:
Frequency
How often is the activity occurring?
Velocity
How quickly are funds entering and leaving?
Aggregation
What is the customer’s cumulative activity?
Relationships
Are different accounts or individuals connected?
Behaviour
Is the customer’s activity consistent with the established profile?
Economic activity
Is there meaningful gaming activity corresponding to the financial activity?
Direction of funds
Where did the funds come from and where did they go?
- Why “No Gaming” Can Matter
One of the recurring themes in the report is activity involving the purchase and cashing out of casino chips with little or no gaming activity.
The report identifies this as an indicator of money laundering involving casino value instruments.
It also identifies account activity with little or no gambling activity as an indicator in relation to casino accounts.
This is important because the apparent purpose of the transaction may be gaming, while the actual behaviour may be primarily value conversion.
For a risk analyst, the relevant question becomes:
Does the financial activity make economic sense in the context of the customer’s actual gaming behaviour?
That question is much more informative than simply asking whether a transaction was successful.
- Casino Accounts Add Another Layer
Casino accounts can create additional opportunities for movement of funds.
The report notes that casino accounts may receive deposits through cash, cheques, bank cheques or wire transfers, with funds subsequently withdrawn or moved with minimal or no gambling activity.
The report also identifies:
- significant account activity within a short period;
- funds withdrawn shortly after deposit;
- transactions conducted by people other than the account holder;
- transfers involving foreign casino or bank accounts;
- third-party transfers;
- structured deposits and withdrawals;
- use of multiple names;
- false or stolen identities;
- activity inconsistent with the customer’s profile.
Therefore, monitoring should not stop at the gaming transaction.
The casino account itself becomes a risk object.
- What This Means for Payment Acquirers
For payment providers working with gaming merchants, the FATF findings translate into several practical underwriting questions.
Before approving a gaming merchant, an acquirer or payment provider should understand:
Customer funding
- What payment methods will customers use?
- Are third-party payments permitted?
- What customer geographies are expected?
- What are typical deposit sizes?
Gaming activity
- What is the expected customer transaction frequency?
- How does deposit behaviour relate to actual gaming?
- What happens when customers do not play?
Withdrawals
- How are winnings paid?
- Are withdrawals made to the original funding instrument?
- Are third-party withdrawals permitted?
- How are unusually frequent withdrawals handled?
Transaction monitoring
- Are linked transactions aggregated?
- Can the system identify rapid transaction sequences?
- Can multiple accounts be linked where appropriate?
- Are repeated threshold-adjacent transactions detected?
Merchant behaviour
- Does actual transaction activity match the merchant’s declared business model?
- Are there sudden changes in average ticket size?
- Are there unusual geographic shifts?
- Are transaction volumes increasing dramatically without an apparent business explanation?
- The Underwriting Lesson: Do Not Underwrite the Average Transaction
For gaming merchants, an average transaction value can be misleading.
Suppose a merchant reports:
Average deposit: $50
That does not tell an underwriter whether the merchant also has:
- thousands of deposits within short periods;
- concentrated customer activity;
- unusual withdrawal patterns;
- multiple accounts associated with one customer;
- rapid deposit-to-withdrawal cycles;
- significant third-party activity.
The FATF report’s indicators demonstrate why transaction behaviour can be more important than a simple average.
A sophisticated underwriting model should therefore consider:
Ticket size + velocity + frequency + customer profile + geography + payment method + gaming behaviour + withdrawal behaviour.
- Structuring Is a Network Problem
The biggest lesson from the FATF/APG analysis is that structuring should not be viewed as merely a transaction problem.
It is a network problem.
A transaction may connect:
Customer → Account → Payment Method → Casino → Gaming Activity → Chip/Value Instrument → Withdrawal → Beneficiary
When multiple customers, accounts or payment instruments become connected, the network becomes even more important.
For payment providers, this means monitoring should ideally identify relationships rather than merely evaluate isolated events.
The objective is not to automatically label every connected transaction as suspicious.
The objective is to identify patterns requiring enhanced review.
- Indicators Are Not Conclusions
This point deserves emphasis.
The FATF/APG report provides indicators of potential money laundering.
An indicator does not establish that money laundering has occurred.
For example:
- a high-volume customer may genuinely be a high roller;
- multiple transactions may have a legitimate commercial explanation;
- a customer may legitimately move between gaming tables;
- a large withdrawal may represent genuine winnings;
- a transaction near a reporting threshold may be coincidental.
The risk arises when multiple indicators combine and the overall activity becomes inconsistent with the customer’s profile or expected behaviour.
The report itself emphasises the need for greater vigilance around transaction and play patterns, unusual transactions and possible suspicious transaction indicators.
Therefore:
Indicator ≠ Suspicion ≠ Proof
The correct compliance process is to use indicators to determine whether further investigation, enhanced due diligence or reporting is warranted under the applicable framework.
- The Payment Industry Takeaway
The FATF/APG report was published in 2009, but its core observation about structuring remains highly relevant to payment risk analysis:
Criminals do not necessarily try to make transactions invisible.
They may instead try to make them look individually ordinary.
That distinction changes how payment providers should think about monitoring.
The question should not be:
“Was this transaction below the threshold?”
It should be:
“What does this transaction mean when viewed alongside the customer’s broader activity?”
That means analysing:
Individual transactions
↓
Linked transactions
↓
Customer behaviour
↓
Account relationships
↓
Funding and withdrawal patterns
↓
Overall economic purpose
That is where meaningful AML risk analysis begins.
Conclusion: The Pattern Is the Risk Signal
The FATF/APG report’s treatment of structuring and smurfing provides an important lesson for casinos, gaming operators, payment processors, acquirers and merchant underwriters.
Money laundering can be concealed not by reducing the total amount of money involved, but by fragmenting the activity.
The fragmentation can occur across:
- transactions;
- customers;
- accounts;
- branches;
- casino tables;
- gaming rooms;
- staff shifts;
- payment instruments;
- casinos within a group;
- third parties.
The result is a transaction trail in which each individual event may appear relatively ordinary.
But the combined pattern may tell a very different story.
For payment providers, this is why effective risk management cannot rely solely on transaction thresholds.
Threshold monitoring identifies events.
Behavioural monitoring identifies patterns.
And in high-risk gaming environments, understanding the pattern is often the more important part of the AML equation.


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